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Charity, Philanthropy, Public Service or Enterprise:  
What are the Big Questions of Nonprofit Management 
Today? 
 
Roger A. Lohmann 





For some people in public affairs and administration, nonprofit 
management represents an alternative form of public service; a career path 
somewhat apart from a career in government service. For others, nonprofit 
management is a relatively narrow interest growing out of the historical 
development of service contracting with the nonprofit sector – that rather 
amorphous entity consisting currently, we are told, of about 1.4 million non-
taxed entities, 825,000 of which are 501 (c) 3 corporations, together with 
about 70,000 foundations (Smith and Lipsky, 1992; Lohmann and Lohmann, 
2002, 453-468; NCCS, 2006).  For others, nonprofit management is a 
deliberate career path, and for a relatively smaller number, voluntary action 
(aka community action or community development) is a calling – an 
opportunity to make a difference in the world. 
This essay takes a birds-eye view of the topic of nonprofit 
management, looking at what I see as the “big issues” in nonprofit 
management today. 
 
1.  Sector of What? 
My first ‘big question’ is what exactly is ‘the third’ a sector of? Society? 
Polity? Economy? Nation? Culture? All (or none) of the above? Perhaps the 
most common answer to this question in third sector studies today is that the 
third sector is a cluster of tax-exempt/ tax deductible organizations that 
together constitute civil society and can be contrasted with ‘market’ and 
‘state’ organizations. I and many others find this answer problematic on a 
large number of fronts.  My own answer comes in the form of an assertion 
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that the notion of a ‘nonprofit sector’ of tax-exempt, tax-deductible 
organizations properly belongs in a more expansive vision known as the 
social economy. This model was articulated more than a century ago by 
French scholars, offered up several times recently by French and Canadian 
scholars, is thriving in several other domains but is still not widely 
recognized by nonprofit scholars in the U.S. In its canonical European form, 
the social economy refers to the totality of nonprofits including foundations, 
together with cooperatives, ‘mutuals’ or membership associations. (See 
Quarter, 1992; Quarter, Mook and Richmond, 2003)  
A distinctive U.S. version of social economy, comparable in all 
important respects to the international view, is already a legal and 
institutional reality; inherent in the various sections of the U.S. Tax Code 
from 501 (a), through (d), including the roughly two dozen variants of Section 
501 (c), as well as Section 528 and a few other choice locations. All together, 
the IRS descriptive information on its public charities and nonprofits web 
pages mentions 60 distinct types of organizations. 
(www.irs.gov/charities/index.html) These provisions of federal law are 
reinforced by and interact with state incorporation statutes and tax codes 
and the assorted references of a number of other federal, state and local codes 
and regulations. Taken together, they clearly outline a U.S. social economy, 
of which what the code calls ‘public charities’ and ‘foundations’ are important, 
but not exclusive, components. In light of existing policy, does it make sense 
to continue to focus on only two of this large and interrelated set of perhaps 
three dozen defined categories of nonprofit entities, and to call them ‘the 
nonprofit sector’? I don’t believe that it does. 
Surely, the nonprofit sector, as narrowly construed, is an important 
entity in and of itself, and also historically important in recent decades, in 
much the way that the steel and auto industries were in the 1940’s for 
example, but the third sector is nothing like the sort of free-standing entity 
sometimes portrayed by nonprofit scholars who equate it with civil society or 
differentiate it alone from government and market sectors.  Legally, 
economically, politically and socially, it is part and parcel of something 
larger, and that something is best termed the social economy. The 
fundamental reason for this is the distinctive set of economic concerns – 
defining the appropriate and necessary legal restraints on gifts and donations 
and accountability and control of the pooled assets and property given – that 
have formed the framework of all U.S. ‘nonprofit law’ from the very 
beginning.  And it is law – constitutional, corporate and charitable trust law 
in particular – around which the institutions, associations and formal 
organizations of the third sector have been formed.  
In this context, we need to look much more closely at whether, by the 
term third sector we mean the ‘natural’ or spontaneous social emergents like 
voluntary associations and social movements of civil society--or whether, we 
 3 
mean the legal infrastructure of contracts, corporations, and charitable 
trusts. Is the third sector, in other words, a matter of behavioral, or of 
institutional analysis, or both? And, if in the highly interdisciplinary context 
of contemporary third sector studies the answer comes back ‘both’, how are 
we to take care to assure that each is given its proper due? 
The official U.S. social economy, as it exists in the nomenclature of the 
tax code and other public policy, encompasses public charities and 
foundations, along with a variety of other forms of social enterprise. This 
includes cooperatives, labor unions, political parties, and other membership 
organizations, a variety of non-exempt advocacy activities, various ‘public 
trusts’, mutual benefit entities and an additional assortment of ventures.1 
The big issue facing nonprofit management currently is whether, 
indeed, “the nonprofit sector” of public charities and foundations is a major 
conceptual category, even a “civil society” as some have suggested, and where 
in this scheme of things, these other organizations belong. Can it be that this 
broad range of legally characterized ‘nonprofit’ efforts including political 
parties and interest and advocacy groups, cooperatives, credit unions and 
unincorporated associations of all sorts should also be of interest? 
A related, secondary question is whether the concept of “civil society” 
has any interest at all for nonprofit management? Or, is civil society--as 
currently construed--only a topic concerned with individuals (qua citizens and 
civic persons) and small groups, while nonprofit management is concerned 
principally with organizations and corporations? I am aware that this may 
appear a somewhat subtle distinction, but it is the tip of a wedge that has 
big, bold implications for research, scholarly activity and ultimately 
management practice. In any meaningful current model of civil society, do 
board-governed corporations that have delegated significant responsibilities 
for their operations to part-or-full time executives and subordinate staff 
members in their employ even appear, much less figure prominently?  
When we speak of a topic like nonprofit management to an audience of 
public affairs, public administration and public policy scholars and students 
inclined to approach this entire domain of nonprofit management as an 
alternative to government service or public management, the expanded vision 
of the social economy covers far more territory than the more limited sphere 
of the conventional ‘nonprofit sector’.   
 
2. Has Entrepreneurship Trumped Philanthropy? 
                                               
1 See www.irs.gov/charities/index.html. For those wishing to pursue the matter further, the entire 
tax code is available online at http://www.fourmilab.ch/ustax/www/t26-A-1-F-I-501.html. 
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Another of the big issues of nonprofit management – and a direct outgrowth 
of the ever-present urge to be ‘more business-like’ – is the proper positioning 
for a broad array of concepts of social entrepreneurship. By this term, I mean 
to suggest the full range of incentive-based approaches to social 
improvement, and the accompanying tropes of enterprise borrowed from the 
business world.2 There can be little doubt that a great many nonprofit 
organizations – for example, hospitals – see themselves and are seen as 
dynamic enterprises, rather than staid, old philanthropies and see their 
collective activities as an industry rather than an institution. 
To suggest in the current American context that the enterprise of 
health care is (or should be) predominantly philanthropic – literally, 
conducted for the love of mankind – is to risk being treated as the proverbial 
skunk at the picnic! It is one of the foremost tropes of enterprise today to 
acknowledge that health care is an industry and treating the sick is a 
business. Much the same may be said for a range of other fee-based social 
services, and other public charities. Current management thinking in public 
administration and related management disciplines is doing a great deal to 
advance these ideas. And, in general, the larger the enterprise – the more 
people and money involved – the more likely it appears that the enterprise 
model and entrepreneurial visions have supplanted more traditional models 
of philanthropy. 
The big issue this poses for nonprofit management is whether there 
will be a place remaining in this increasingly entrepreneurial world for the 
non-incentive based, and non-financially viable activities, and what that 
place will be. Accounting standards and model nonprofit statutes have 
already been revised to reflect these changes. Where, in a world of enterprise, 
is one to find a place for obligation and philanthropy? This is a very large 
question, indeed. 
 
3. What is Nonprofit Organization? 
I would also like to note briefly another important definitional concern. 
It is a relatively routine matter in contemporary nonprofit research to refer to 
“nonprofit organizations” as if there were something recognizable, 
homogeneous and distinct in the ways in which people organize themselves 
                                               
2 It is consistent with the notion of three sectors to differentiate three principal motivational 
patterns as well: incentive-based approaches – roughly, expectations of rewards as motivation - 
can be distinguished from the rules-based approach of the ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy – 
with the deontological ‘rewards’ of duty (including the duties of charity) and the relations-based 
approach of the ideal type of the commons with the interpersonal rewards of stewardship and 
philia, often translated as fellowship, ‘civic friendship’, or philanthropy, in the most extreme case, 
love of mankind. 
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under nonprofit corporate and tax-exempt auspices. I would ask whether, in 
the instances most frequently studied – nonprofit health care, and social 
service settings and “private” schools and universities – this is the case, or if 
we have not yet gotten to the real nature of these organizations, 
sociologically, politically or economically. 
The real question in the case of the ordinarily conceived nonprofit 
sector of 501 (c) 3 and 501 (c) 4 organizations is whether a legal contingency – 
the fact that a class (or several classes) of nonprofit organization in the U.S. 
social economy must strictly observe particular nondistribution constraints as 
defined by the IRS in order not to pay corporate income taxes and to accept 
tax-exempt donations – is sufficient grounds on which to define a type of 
organization. Much of the literature of nonprofit studies is written as though 
the answer were unequivocally affirmative. Yet, details about the nature of 
this distinctive form of organization are somewhat scanty, and, as 
functioning organizations, most nonprofits look a great deal like ad hoc 
blends of main street business offices and government bureaus. 
This is not a criticism the relatively large number of organizational 
analyses – including well-known works by Bielefeld and Galeskowitz (1997), 
which focused on management strategies, Smith and Lipsky (1992), which 
focused on purchase of services, Anthony and Young (1984), which focused on 
management control, or multiple works by Lester Salamon and Helmut 
Anheier, which focus in general on what I would call the characteristics of 
“thirdness.” These and literally dozens of other studies of nonprofit 
organization, all make interesting, useful and valuable contributions. But, do 
they clearly and convincingly make the case for ‘the nonprofit organization’ 
as a distinct and recognizable organizational form?  
It is relatively easy to suggest that they do not. They do not give us a 
clear picture of a distinctive ‘nonprofit organization’, but instead suggest a 
kind of opportunistic bureaucracy, combining in some unspecified, ad hoc 
ways, the incentives of the firm with the rules (or policies) of the bureaucracy. 
In other words, the nonprofit organization of the present is a hybrid. Almost 
all of the ‘nonprofit organizations’ I am aware of, by which I mean nonprofit 
hospitals, clinics, colleges, schools, and a vast array of social services from 
adoption agencies to work programs, incorporated in their states, governed by 
volunteer boards and managed by careerist and professional managers, look 
very much like neo-Weberian bureaucracies operating under such ad hoc 
mixtures of rule-based (or “policy-based”) and incentive-based regimes. 
Perhaps they are most analogous to the mule. Is a mule a unique animal? 
Yes, it is a limited form of uniqueness. Formed from the union of a horse and 
a donkey, mules are sterile and incapable of reproducing their own kind. One 
can only wonder how far the mule analogy will hold: In particular, can this 
form of ‘nonprofit organization’ survive and reproduce beyond the social 
circumstances (most notably government contracting) that gave rise to it? 
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Nonprofit management across numerous disciplines continues to 
restrict our attention and practice to an overly narrow and limited range of 
organizational possibilities (Lohmann, 1990). This should be an issue of 
major scholarly and theoretical concern, for presently, all that the future of 
the third sector appears to holds is more opportunistic bureaucracy within 
the regime of interest-group liberalism or ‘private government’.  
As long as we cling to the false view that only ‘nonprofit organizations’ 
consisting of rule- and incentive-driven bureaucratic hierarchies can be 
practical, efficient and effective, a vast range of highly interesting 
alternatives, variations and possibilities will continue to allude us. 
Everything from flat hierarchies, to feminist organizations, groups, networks, 
associations, orders, movements, and open spaces and many, many other 
organized alternatives will continue to be shunted aside or downplayed in the 
name of good management, as unwise and impractical. Make no mistake: 
These forms will continue to happen, but they will do so beyond the 
theoretical reaches of our research and theory, or treated as anomalies. Many 
of us who have seen alternative possibilities will continue to regard this as 
sad and unfortunate. 
 
4.  Can We Achieve Philanthropic Sufficiency? 
Yet another big question is located squarely within the traditional 
world of philanthropy. To understand it fully requires just a bit of 
background. A modern doctrine we might call public philanthropy has been 
an article of neoconservative faith for most of the past century. It has 
emerged most recently as an alternative to, and rival of, the welfare state.  
This is the seemingly widespread belief that the public (governmental) 
sector should be as small as possible, and taxes as low as possible. As a 
result, important matters of public concern like the care of the poor, the 
mentally ill, the old and the weak are no longer regarded as suitable subjects 
for public engagement, except insofar as policy relegates their care to 
nongovernmental ‘voluntary’ organizations.  
To several generations of progressives, including Jane Addams and 
Teddy Roosevelt, limited government and large doses of voluntary action 
were articles of faith. Although the historical record has been considerably 
glossed over of late, New Deal liberals and welfare statists from FDR to 
Walter Mondale also gave what they believed was proper homage to this 
doctrine of limited government. The American public sector, even at its 
largest and most expansive, has never accounted for more than a small 
fraction of the entire U.S. economy. Old order conservatives, however, were 
unrelenting in their commitment to their belief that any governmental public 
sector was too large ( Cornuelle, 1965). They have been joined in this view in 
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recent decades by a mix of modern libertarians, social conservatives and 
others to form a ‘neo-conservatism’ that arose in reaction against the Great 
Society and endorsed nothing short of the withering away of the state (a 
phenomenon characterized by a wide range of political labels and slogans 
from “privatization” to “starving the beast” and “compassionate 
conservatism”).  
In the hands of political leaders like Presidents Reagan and G.H.W. 
Bush, a key provision of this visionary transformation was a doctrine we can 
call philanthropic sufficiency: The claim that voluntary action – private 
giving and volunteer labor for the public good – offer a sufficient and 
politically preferable way of dealing with the social problems the 
Progressives steered toward government. This doctrine has never been far 
from the surface in the last several decades and resurfaced during recent 
Presidential campaigns in the form of the slogan, “compassionate 
conservatism” and  in the “faith-based services” initiative. 
This neo-conservative political doctrine was neatly encoded in the 
INDEPENDENT SECTOR mantra first unveiled in 1987: Give Five. The exact 
formula for philanthropic sufficiency encoded in that slogan combines 
targeted donations of five percent of personal incomes in the form of 
donations and five hours a week spent volunteering. It was implied that this 
would be sufficient to achieve the neoconservative dream of a society 
combining low taxes and high levels of philanthropy. This offers, on the 
whole, a modest alternative to the proverbial tithing, of biblical proportions 
that set the level of giving twice as high – one tenth.  
However, the reality is that despite more than 25 years of a variety of 
public policy initiatives based on the presumption of philanthropic 
sufficiency the nonprofit sector has not been able to pick up the slack. As the 
final phrase on the IS “Give Five” webpage now notes, “The nonprofit sector 
cannot take the place of government programs, nor can it single-handedly 
cure the ills and disparities of society.”3 The main reason that this appears to 
be so is that we continue to exist in what might be termed a steady state of 
philanthropic insufficiency; the aggregate level of private giving in the U.S. 
remains currently just under two percent, and has never risen above half the 
IS target – one fourth of the historic tithe. Moreover, there is no sign it will 
do so anytime soon.  
The big questions this raises can be addressed in a number of different 
ways. In our highly partisan time, “blue” liberals will interpret this as a 
failure of neoconservative doctrine, and “red” neo-conservatives will respond 
in kind. For the practice of nonprofit management, however, the issue is 
whether and how it may be possible to break the glass ceiling of 
                                               
3 http://www.independentsector.org/give5/givefive.html 
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philanthropic insufficiency and generate aggregate giving greater than 2 
percent. 
 
5. Are We More Business-like Yet? 
Everyone connected with nonprofit management at one time or another 
comes into contact with business people who will offer, in all seriousness, the 
suggestion that nonprofit organizations need to be more business-like. 
Currently, I encounter this most frequently in the form of young scholars in 
schools of business who submit manuscripts to Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership that begin with a stock introduction informing readers that 
nonprofit management has much to learn from the superior insights of 
business management. Never do they acknowledge that there is an 
opportunity for reciprocal learning, with which I agree heartily; only that 
nonprofits have much to learn. Non-business school reviewers regularly 
retort with references to Enron, which before its collapse had been named 
America’s Most Innovative Company six years in a row.  
In most instances, what constitutes being “more businesslike” is 
relatively innocuous and common-sense advice suggesting little more than 
strictures to: be instrumental and goal oriented, and prudent with scarce 
resources; to act wisely and try not to do stupid or foolish things. In many 
instances, good, common sense suggestions flow from this. It is astounding to 
many of us, for example, how many nonprofit managers at any given moment 
haven’t the vaguest concept of the time value of money, how to do a budget, 
or the elementary insight that sometimes doing one thing means you cannot 
do another (i.e., that opportunity costs exist). 
However, the advice to be more business-like in nonprofit management, 
while usually good, can also be extraordinarily bad advice. In at least one 
instance, there is mounting evidence that has been published in both 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly and Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership and several other places that the conventional, business-like, 
wisdom is not only wrong, but dangerously so. (Tuckman and Chang, 1991; 
Greenlee and Trussel, 2001; Trussel, 2004 )  
The advice usually given is some form of: Nonprofit managers, keep your 
administrative costs (aka overhead or indirect costs) as low as possible, and 
always under 10%. Ditto for fundraising costs. For the largest nonprofits – 
hospitals and colleges, and a few of the largest social services, for example – 
this is generally a pretty easy standard to live by. Managers of small 
nonprofits have recognized the basically suicidal nature of such prescriptions. 
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6. Will We Pay More Attention to the Advice or the Evidence? 
When considering this question, another question also arises. That is 
whether research evidence – not will o’ the wisp flights of fancy, ideology or 
fashion, but good, hard, solid empirical evidence – can ever really genuinely 
guide management practice in nonprofit settings? Keeping your overhead 
costs low is one of the most durable myths of nonprofit management – 
particularly among business-oriented board members and funding sources 
One can easily find evidence of this belief scattered widely: In the quibbling 
attentions of board members over office supplies or telephone costs in the 
agency budget, to the protestations of foundations that they “will not pay 
overhead” for certain grants. It is even found inscribed in legislation: The 
Older Americans Act, for example, solemnly mandates that no more than 8% 
of the cost of Title III aging services may be expended on administrative 
costs. 
The implication of such well-meaning advice is clear, and closely related 
to the philanthropic sufficiency argument above: If only malingering 
managers and self-interested bureaucrats can trim wasteful and extravagant 
excesses, the nonprofit sector will be a better place! Yet, a growing body of 
research evidence affirms what most nonprofit managers already know: that 
advice is also dead wrong; and dangerously so. A large body of literature 
provides unmistakable evidence, gathered from a combined total of random 
samples of nearly 10,000 non-profit organizations, that low administrative 
costs are one of the principal predictors of fiscal distress in nonprofits 
(Tuchman and Chang, 1991; Greenlee and Trussel, 2001; Trussel, Greenlee 
and Brady, 2004; Hodge and Piccolo, 2005). The explanation for this finding 
is remarkably simple and common-sensical: Low administrative costs aid and 
abet fiscal distress in nonprofit organizations, by restricting the management 
capacity of the organization to deal with distress – lost grants and contracts, 
insufficient assets, downturns in fundraising, and the like. It makes sense, 
and a growing body of research evidence supports this point.  
As statistical evidence goes, this may be one of the best substantiated in 
nonprofit studies. (Large, national random samples, no contradictory 
findings, etc.) Yet, 15 years after the first such finding was reported , the 
impact on practice has been negligible and, I predict, will continue to be so, 
simply because it flies in the face of not one, but two very powerful myths. 
The first myth has already been mentioned: that low administrative cost is 
an unqualified good. The second is that the impact of administrative costs is 
evenly distributed across all organizations. In reality, low administrative 
costs are much easier to achieve in large organizations, and the vast majority 
of nonprofit organizations are small.  
Thus, the question of whether nonprofit management practice can ever 
really be empirically grounded is a serious question. 
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7.  Will Nonprofit Boards Ever Be Well-Run? 
Now let me turn to an issue of another sort. As an editor, I am 
constantly struck by the number of well-meaning manuscripts that pass over 
my desk on the general topic of how to improve the operation of nonprofit 
boards of directors. Roughly 20% of all manuscripts we receive at Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership deal with some aspect of the topic of boards 
and board governance. The subject seems to hold a nearly infinite fascination 
for nonprofit researchers. And, I might note, another widespread myth for 
which anything beyond anecdotal evidence is currently lacking is that 
nonprofit boards are generally pretty slipshod, run-amok ventures of 
volunteers who don’t quite measure up to the high standards of the corporate 
boards market where members are paid for their efforts. I wish to suggest 
that the question of whether or not claims about the general ineffectiveness 
of nonprofit boards are true – whether or not nonprofit boards are well run 
and effective at what they do while nonprofit boards are not – suffers from a 
high degree of categorical confusion.   
In my view, the issue of board governance suffers from the confusion of 
mistaking what is inherently a political (in the Greek sense, perhaps better 
rendered as civic) task of governing the affairs of a nonprofit organization for 
a purely technical one of achieving recognizable results. One of the broader 
unrealized implications of what is probably the most widely cited recent 
work on boards - Herman and Renz’ (1997) research on reality-construction 
in boards – is the direction in which their “social constructivism” points: Not 
toward relativism and away from objectivism, as some suspect, but rather 
away from technocracy and toward politics/civics. A political view narrowly 
construed is unavoidable in mediating between the outlooks, demands and 
expectations of multiple constituencies. What many have failed to see is that 
it also captures the essential character of board governance. 
I recently became aware of another form of this particular categorical 
confusion (which is actually very pervasive today.) Annually, we take groups 
of graduate students to observe the state legislature and participate in the 
legislative process. The first and foremost impression reported from several 
successive student cohorts in recent years has been that the legislature could 
almost certainly conduct its business more efficiently and this would almost 
certainly result in greater effectiveness – usually defined as passage of a 
higher number of bills. The profoundly complex political challenge of self-
government by a sovereign people is, in their view, reduced to the technical 
challenge of adopting more bills. Is the similarly complex question of 
nonprofit self-governance receiving the same treatment? 
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I fear we are applying much the same standards to the similarly 
complex issue of nonprofit governance. The legal and philosophical basis for 
creating nonprofit organizations can be summarized accurately as self-
governance: An association or a corporation, whether it is organized for profit 
or as a nonprofit, whether it is manufacturing automobiles, delivering social 
services, or superintending marshlands and duck eggs, has an inherently 
self-governing quality that remains unchanged when the organization 
contracts to deliver contract services with a unit of government. The 
misunderstanding of the nature of state government inherent in the view 
that the purpose of the legislature can be measured in terms of the number 
of bills it passes is entirely of a piece with the technocratic view that the 
principal challenge of a nonprofit board is to govern more efficiently and 
effectively.  
A part of this challenge involves discerning the external environmental 
demands and constraints that must be dealt with; the greater challenge (as 
the Herman-Renz perspective notes) involves the “internal” challenges of 
self-governance: mediating the environmental press of stakeholders’ claims 
and demands into a viable enterprise. Yet, the thrust of much of our current 
board research is on the question of how such self-governing boards – 
ultimately responsible only to their stakeholders – can properly satisfy 
standards and criteria established by external and self-appointed technical 
experts who simply lack standing to offer the advice they insist upon giving.  
Of course it is also the case that external funding sources that wish to 
support a nonprofit organization have obligations and opportunities and – as 
a contractual condition – can specify terms of board governance, which the 
nonprofit is then free to accept or reject. I personally doubt, however, that 
this extends to the level of general knowledge, such that nonprofit educators 
should be assuming the role of guardians and teaching in our nonprofit 
management programs how each and every nonprofit board ‘ought’ to conduct 
its affairs, anymore than we should be concluding that legislatures need to 
become more efficient in their passage of bills. 
 
8.  Can Accounting Information Provide Accountability? 
 One of the dirty little secrets of nonprofit management concerns the 
general, all-purpose uselessness of nonprofit financial statements. Let me 
stipulate immediately that nonprofit financial statements serve well the sole 
elementary purpose of tracking resource flows. Thanks to the current state of 
the art, nonprofit managers and boards seldom misplace or fail to notice 
significant quantities of financial resources. Apart from this, however, for 
guiding the essential tasks of management, notably pursuit of mission, 
nonprofit financial statements are almost (but not quite) completely useless. 
 12 
Modeled after the statements of the for-profit world under the terms of 
enterprise accounting, nonprofit financial statements are supposed to yield 
true and accurate portraits of the current condition and recent changes in the 
value of a nonprofit organization. And in a certain, minimal, sense they do 
that.  
All manner of courses and workshops have been mounted over the 
years to teach students and neophyte managers the real secrets of these 
esoteric documents. The real secret is that for the typical small nonprofit 
with assets under $5 million, there just isn’t all that much there. If you read 
closely you can detect subtle patterns of change in spending on salaries, rent 
or the phone bill. And if any of those engaged in criminal behavior or 
skullduggery in the organization are sufficiently stupid or careless, they will 
leave traces detectable in the financial statements. But you generally don’t 
have to read nonprofit statements too closely to see that most nonprofits have 
a very limited range of available resources, consisting mostly of some cash in 
the bank, pretty shaky sources of financial inflows, some very ordinary (and 
tightly constrained) expenditures and very limited debt. But, if you try to get 
from their financial statements any real sense of where the organization 
stands and what it is accomplishing – what it strives to be and to do, and how 
well it is doing it, or any of the other real questions of accountability – you 
almost certainly will fail and need to look elsewhere.  
 Some recent work on social accounting – particularly the work of Jack 
Quarter, Laurie Mook and Mary Jane Richmond in Toronto and the fiscal 
distress research mentioned above – has attempted to massage the existing 
financial reporting schemes of accounting to produce more useful 
management information. (Quarter, Mook and Richmoond, 2003) These are 
certainly steps in the right direction.  
There is also a variety of potentially interesting work underway on 
other aspects of this problem. Nonprofit Management and Leadership has 
published some interesting work by Gerhard Speckbacher, and will be 
publishing some work by a group in Holland led by Ralf Caers on the 
continuum of enterprise and stewardship approaches. Much more of this sort 
of work needs to be done before this big question of financial accountability 
can really be dealt with.  
 
9.  Should Foundations Change? 
 According to the latest information, there are now upwards of 70,000 
foundations in the United States. Of course, only a relative handful of these 
account for the lion’s share of assets, while the vast majority are small 
foundations with limited assets and highly individualized giving programs. 
The largest foundations have always had a major influence on nonprofit 
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organizations and sectors, especially in such matters as establishing and 
defining the norm of program grants and their sometimes vastly exaggerated 
claims of their own influence on social change.  
 I think there are at least three big questions that we should be asking 
in this domain. The answers to these questions could have a profound impact 
on the way we do business in the nonprofit world in the future. The first is 
whether the case for program innovation is as strong as has been claimed in 
the past, or should foundations be finding different ways to award funding 
not involving specious claims to innovation. In particular, should these 
foundations with their vast fortunes be at least selectively supporting the 
normal everyday operations of nonprofits, and not always striving for the 
(increasingly bogus) claims of the “next new thing”? 
A second question about foundations is certainly a big question, and 
somewhat more far reaching. That is the question of whether the five percent 
rule is still appropriate. This rule mandates that foundations spend at least 
five percent of their net earnings each year. Five percent was a compromise 
level between those who favored more and those who favored no rule at all 
(i.e., 0%). Now, after several decades of experience should we be asking more 
questions about what has actually happened as a result of this rule, and 
whether continuation of the rule, or changes are justified. 
A final question about foundations is the most far reaching of all: And 
that is whether the case for perpetual existence of foundations is a strong 
one. Does anyone really want the Ford Foundation or the Carnegie 
Corporation still orchestrating claims of innovation five centuries from now? 
Or, should public law and tax policy be restructured to assure that 
foundations spend themselves out in something like a generation or two?  
 
10. How Will Public Administration Be Changed By Nonprofit Management? 
 Further, I would like to look at several related questions of specific 
interest to public administration, public management, and public affairs. The 
first of these questions is whether there is a legitimate public administration 
claim to, or interest in, nonprofit management reaching beyond the 
straightforward issue of purchase of services and contracting. Closely 
associated with that question are the related issues of whether the ‘shadow 
state’ represented by the nonprofit sector is actually a state at all, and 
whether ‘third party governance’ is actually government in any meaningful 
sense (Milward, 1994; Salamon, 1987; Wolch, 1990). 
If public administration is going to continue and expand its interest in 
the broad field of nonprofit organizations and the third sector, some attention 
to questions such as these will be necessary.  
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11. Will Nonprofit Management Change The Relation Between Public 
Administration and Allied Program Fields? 
 
 Another question which strikes me as important from my own 
particular vantage points involves the degree to which interest in nonprofit 
management can be expected to change the relation between public 
administration and such related disciplines as social work, health care, the 
arts and other disciplines and interests I would lump together here as “allied 
program fields.”  I ask this question as the holder of an MPA degree , with 
almost 35 years experience in social work education, more than 25 of which 
have been spent on the social work end of a dual-degree program with public 
administration that actually formed the organizational core of a newly 
created school. The basic question is whether there is a need to rethink the 
curriculum relation between public administration and other professionally 
oriented ventures – social work, education, health care, the arts, 
environmental and community development to name just a few. This is 
directly an issue of nonprofit management concern since so very of these 




 This list of the big questions of nonprofit management, like any such 
list, is obviously a matter of personal preferences. Others might select some 
or all of these issues, but would almost certainly select others as well. Placing 
greater emphasis on human resources questions, for example, or on more 
practical matters like improved ways to locate resources would almost 
certainly rank higher on some lists. And I would welcome the opportunity to 
consider those suggestions and arguments. 
The point of an exercise like this is less a matter of finding or certifying 
“the right answers” to the question of what are the big questions of nonprofit 
management. It is more a matter of the thought and discussion such open-
ended questions provoke. Readers should consider themselves challenged to 
consider such questions and compose their own lists of big questions.  
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